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Abstract 
China is concerned about the security of its sea-lanes for imports and desires to diversify 
its oil supplies from the Middle East in order to sustain economic growth. These concerns 
have sparked China’s interest in trying to ensure oil supplies from as many sources as 
possible and in reducing its overwhelming reliance on seaborne imports of oil, which, in 
China’s view, is considered less vulnerable to disruption than oil arriving by tankers. In 
this context, China has turned the eyes on the emerging oil and gas fields in Africa. 
Through its high-profile oil diplomacy, China has been successful in developing its 
access to African oil and gas resources. However, China’s oil diplomacy in Africa has 
been roundly criticized in Western capitals. Washington increasingly perceives that 
Beijing’s ties to the so-called rogue states undermine the U.S. goals of isolating or 
punishing these states that fail to prompt democracy, limit nuclear proliferation or respect 
human rights.  
 
This paper argues that China’s hunt for oil in Africa has been exaggerated by partly-
informed commentators, sometimes based on erroneous information, not to mention those 
that deliberately paint the distorted picture. That said, the paper suggests that, in pursuing 
its oil diplomacy, Beijing should take into account many factors including Washington 
concerns, in particular when U.S. concerns also reflect those of a large section of the 
international community. The paper points out that devoting more resources to build a 
better future for all and help to eliminate the fear of another Rwanda or Darfur is a 
positive form that Beijing should take in its engagement with Africa. This way of 
engagement would be considered more positive by the broad community of states, and 
helps to enhance China’s security of energy supply and at the same time would 
significantly reduce one source of tension with Washington. Overall, it will greatly 
benefit Africa as well as China. 
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In the last couple years, the Chinese government has been making serious overtures to 
African countries in order to obtain contracts for fuel supply. There have been numerous 
media reports on this issue. But in my view, China’s hunt for oil in Africa has been 
exaggerated by partly-informed commentators, sometimes based on erroneous 
information, not to mention those that deliberately paint the distorted picture. To put this 
issue into perspective, let me first put China’s overall energy demand and supply in 
context because these factors are often overlooked in discussing the issue. 
 
China is indeed a large energy consumer. In the mean time, China has also become a 
large producer. Currently, domestic supply provides about 94% of the total energy 
consumption in China, meaning that the overall energy dependence (namely, the ratio of 
the energy that a country imports to the total it consumes) is about 6%. In the future, 
China will continue to rely mainly on domestic supply to meet its growing energy 
demand. With a variety of policies and investments that have been made and continue to 
be made to further expand domestic supply capacity, domestic, conventional energy is 
estimated to supply 2400 million tons of coal equivalent (tce) by 2020 (Zhang, 2005). 
 
During the current five-year period running from 2006 to 2010, the Chinese government 
has set a goal of cutting energy use per unit of its gross domestic product by 20%. The 
government has also established medium to long term energy conservation plan to keep 
the country’s total energy demand below 3000 million tce in 2020 (NDRC, 2004). This 
suggests that domestic supply will meet 80% of the total energy consumption. Even if 
energy demand goes up to 3600 million tce in the worst case scenario as some analysts 
suggest, China’s domestic supply is still able to provide two-thirds of the total energy 
demand in 2020. This makes China different from other larger energy-using countries 
like Japan that imports over 80% of its total energy consumption.   
 
That said, this by no means questions the increased importance of China’s growing oil 
imports. China was traditionally self-sufficient in oil, but since 1993 has been a net oil 
importer. China’s economic boom and stagnated supply of domestic oil have produced 
the growing hunger for foreign oil. As of 2003, China emerged second only behind the 
U.S. in terms of oil imports. At present, China imports over 40% of its oil consumption 
and this is expected to rise to 60% or more by 2020 (Zhang, 2005). Energy security has 
risen to the height of importance in its foreign policy, and is becoming what has been 
called a “transforming” factor in the relations between China and the Middle East, Russia, 
and energy-rich Central Asian, African and Latin American countries (Yi, 2005).  
 
China is concerned about the security of its sea-lanes for imports and desires to diversify 
its oil supplies from the Middle East in order to sustain economic growth. These concerns 
have sparked China’s interest in trying to ensure oil supplies from as many sources as 
possible and in reducing its overwhelming reliance on seaborne imports of oil, which, in 
China’s view, is considered less vulnerable to disruption than oil arriving by tankers. 
Given their closeness and accessibility through pipelines, China has been keen to invest 
in Central Asian and Russian oil field development projects and in the construction of 
pipelines in order to bring oil from these regions. In the meantime, China has turned the 
eyes on the emerging oil and gas fields in Africa. Through its high-profile oil diplomacy, 
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China has been successful in developing its access to African oil and gas resources. In the 
meantime, China’s oil diplomacy in Africa has been roundly criticized in Western 
capitals (Eisenman and Stewart, 2005). Critics accused China of fueling conflicts and 
human-rights violations in Africa by selling arms to some repressive regimes in exchange 
for oil and minerals (Bezlova, 2006). 
 
Beijing has been building goodwill by strengthening bilateral trade agreements, awarding 
aid and forgiving national debt. For example, China voluntarily waived US$ 1.2 billion in 
sovereign African debt in 2000 when the China-Africa Cooperation Forum was formed to 
promote trade and investment with 44 African countries (Kitissou, 2005). To date, 
Beijing has given more than US$ 5.5 billion in assistance and canceled the debt of 31 
African countries (Masaki, 2006). Beijing has helped to build the railroad network in 
Nigeria, main roads in Rwanda, as well as bridges, stadiums and harbours. In 
accompanying this, China has forged closer economic relations with Africa. Bilateral 
trade between China and Africa hit a record of US$ 40 billion in 2005, up 35% from 
2004. Given that African-Japanese trade totaled US$ 18 billion in 2005, China is 
outdoing Japan, the world’s second largest economy (Masaki, 2006). 
 
In recent years, the top Chinese leaders frequently paid the visits to oil-producing 
countries. This goodwill-based energy diplomacy has helped China to make remarkable 
inroads in striking energy deals with oil-rich African countries in the Gulf of Guinea, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Libya, Niger, and Sudan. The Chinese oil 
companies’ overseas investments not only mitigate China’s own concern about oil 
security by obtaining equity oil overseas. For example, Sudan is China’s largest overseas 
oil production base, and more than half of the country’s oil exports go to China, which 
accounts for about 5% of China’s total oil imports. Now, Angola has become China’s 
second largest oil supplier behind Saudi Arabia, and Africa as a whole provides over a 
quarter of the Chinese oil imports (British Petroleum, 2006; Xinhua News Agency, 2006). 
The Chinese oil companies’ investments also help these African developing countries to 
raise their standards of living. For example, China’s assistance has helped to turn Sudan 
into an oil-exporting country. Moreover, Chinese investments in oil fields in African 
countries help to pump more oil out of the fields and enlarge the overall availability of oil 
on the world market. The new addition to the markets may help to prevent oil prices 
rising even higher. 
  
Certainly, other Asian countries could follow suit. In my view, this will not affect the 
relationship between Chinese companies and their African counterparts, given China’s 
long-established friendship with African countries and the championing of their interests, 
not to mention mutually, commercially benefits. But this will affect the price of China’s 
oil acquisitions. China has already competed with Japan for oil and gas fields in Russia 
and Central Asia. At present, there is no direct competition between China and Japan for 
African oil resources, largely because Japan has almost ignored Africa as a source of its 
badly needed oil. This may change in the future, because Japan has stepped up its Africa 
diplomacy in recent years. While China aggressively pursuing oil and gas interests in 
Africa plays a part, this has been mainly promoted by a strong desire for Japan to gain 
support from the continent’s 53 countries for its bid for a permanent United Nations 
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Security Council seat (Masaki, 2006). While cooperating with each other occasionally (In 
the first instance of Sino-Indian cooperation, China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) 
and India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corp (ONGC) won a joint bid in December 
2004 to buy PetroCanada’s 37% stake in Syrian oilfields for US$ 573 million. India and 
China also work together in Sudan, where CNPC operates the Greater Nile oilfield, in 
which ONGC has a 25% stake (Aiyar, 2006).), China and India already compete for 
energy resources in Africa as well as in other regions. 
 
The Chinese oil companies have a history of overpaying for equity positions (Balfour, 
2002). Because China has viewed paying a higher price than competitors to secure energy 
resources to be more of a national security issue than the absolute price itself (Bradsher, 
2005), such bidding wars between Chinese companies and Indian rivalries have further 
intensified the tendency of Chinese oil companies paying far above what other 
competitors offer. To date, India has been losing out in every deal that both China and 
India have been shooting for. But China has grabbed these deals by overbidding at least 
10% more than its competitor India has bided. In January 2006, the China National 
Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) bought a 45% stake in the Akpo offshore oil and gas field 
in Nigeria for US$ 2.27 billion by outbidding the competitor, ONGC that submitted a bid 
of US$ 2 billion but withdrew after India’s cabinet raised concerns about the risks 
involved (Aiyar, 2006; Masaki, 2006). In August 2005, CNPC paid US$4.18 billion to 
acquire Canadian oil company PetroKazakhstan, making it China’s largest foreign 
acquisition ever (Bradsher, 2005). Originally, CNPC offered US$ 3.6 billion. With the 
Indian consortium’s (ONGC-Mittal) bid of US$ 3.8 billion, CNPC hiked its offer to 
US$4.18 billion to grab this deal (Basu, 2005). However, it is important to note that the 
higher bid does not always win in a politically charged industry like energy. CNOOC 
failed to acquire Unocal for US$ 18.5 billion, although it topped Chevron’s bid of US$ 
16.4 billion. But, in the end, Chevron grabbed the deal. 
 
It should be pointed out that China’s oil diplomacy has its own price. Critics have 
increasingly labeled China’s relations with oil-producing countries as the oil ties. In their 
views, China’s growing ties with Africa are purely for oil, and as long as it helps the 
country to secure oil deals, China is willing to exchange political, financial and military 
favors without regard to transparency, development and stability in Africa. To put it 
simply, critics accused China of mixing business with politics in pursuit of its economic 
gains in Africa. However, it is important to note that while China appears quite willing to 
get oil from wherever it can, this does not mean that China would not invest elsewhere, 
say, in less “roguish” nations, if it had the option. Under economic rationale, no country 
would prefer to invest in an unstable regime over investment in a more stable one. 
However, China’s options are limited. 
 
Partly because the Western powers have gained control over best oil fields available, as a 
late entrant to the international oil game, China has little choice but to strike deals with 
the so-called rogue states, which are identified by the U.S., to secure oil supplies. 
Washington increasingly perceives that Beijing’s ties to these countries undermine the 
U.S. goals of isolating or punishing rogue states that fail to prompt democracy, limit 
nuclear proliferation or respect human rights (Zweig and Bi, 2005; Wu and Shen, 2006). 
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Although it is unlikely to bring the two countries in direct confrontation, China’s practice 
of oil diplomacy is widely perceived in Washington as attempts to threaten U.S. security 
interests because Beijing strikes deals either with rogue states that Washington has tried 
to marginalize or in America’s backyard which Washington perceives as its turf and 
within its traditional sphere of influence (The U.S. has long regarded Central and South 
America as part of its backyard, and Canada as an extension of its front porch. 
Washington perceives that recent forays by Beijing into the Western Hemisphere, which 
are part of Beijing’s global search for large supplies of oil-based energy, are challenging 
its influence. Beijing’s search has recently taken to Venezuela and Canada, which 
together provide about 25% of U.S. oil imports. The anti-American President of 
Venezuela has spoken of a desire to reduce its dependence on the U.S. market 
(Richardson, 2005). Beijing and Ottawa have concluded a series of energy and resources 
agreements, providing for greater Chinese involvement in developing Canada’s natural 
gas sector, its vast oil sands deposits and its uranium sector. This could create tensions 
between Beijing and Washington as well as between Washington and Ottawa, because 
U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney’s 2001 national energy policy report emphasizes the 
importance of Canada’s tar sands to U.S. energy security (Zweig and Bi, 2005).). Thus, 
China should be very cautious in pursuing this type of oil diplomacy. Let me make this 
point clear. I am not suggesting that Beijing stance should be swayed by Washington. 
What I am suggesting is that Beijing should take into account many factors including 
Washington concerns, in particular when U.S. concerns also reflect those of a large 
section of the international community. 
 
Beijing aggressively pursuing this type of oil diplomacy without proper consideration of 
the international community’s concern may benefit China in the short-term, but may hurt 
it in the longer term, reducing its future benefits. China has achieved its own rise and 
close to being integrated into the global economy and norms. Given that China will not 
possess large scale oceangoing naval capabilities in the near future, it must depend on the 
global economy and norms. Thus, it is in China’s own long-term interest to support the 
stability of the international regimes. For the time being, Beijing should think deeply 
about how to be more nuanced in responding to the concerns and perceptions of 
Washington and Brussels instead of just repeating nonintervention in the domestic affairs 
of other states as its guiding principle of foreign policy. Perhaps devoting more resources 
to build a better future for all and help to eliminate the fear of another Rwanda or Darfur 
is a positive form that Beijing should take in its engagement with Africa. In my view, this 
way of engagement would be considered more positive by the broad community of states, 
and would significantly reduce one source of tension with Washington. In the meantime, 
it will greatly benefit Africa as well as China. 
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